House prices have fallen by nearly 3% since they hit their peak late last year. Prices are still higher (just) than they were a year ago, but only because of the sustained increase in prices through most of 2007. It now seems likely that the year-on-year rate of house price inflation will turn negative at some point during the current year. The question is: how negative?

A downward adjustment of between 5 and 10 per cent seems to be the likeliest outcome. Prices are currently dampened by the effects of last year's interest rate hikes and the current difficulty that people are experiencing in getting mortgages. But the Bank of England has already cut interest rates, and more cuts are in the offing. These have not, in the main, fed through to mortgage payers yet, owing to nervousness surrounding the credit crunch - but they will. And as confidence returns to the banking sector (which may happen after or, hopefully, without another blip or two), mortgages will become easier to find. A moderate adjustment of house prices, followed by a gradual and modest recovery, would not be comfortable. But neither would it cause much real damage.

Meanwhile, in a fascinating recent study, the International Monetary Fund reckons that house prices in the UK are 27% higher than is justified by the fundamentals. Perhaps. For sure that kind of gap could be fixed either by the 'soft landing' that I have described above or by something more drastic.

A more drastic realignment would introduce problems of negative equity on a large scale - where people find that the value of their house does not cover what they owe as a mortgage, thereby making it difficult for them to move house. This has to be seen as a less likely - but nevertheless possible - outcome than a more moderate readjustment.

The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee has today published a report on immigration to the UK. It concludes that the recent wave of immigration has had 'little or no impact' on the economic position of native Britons.

To be sure there are pros and cons of migration. The sharp increase in population that has resulted in certain parts of the country has put (upward) pressure on house prices and local services. It has also put (downward) pressure on wages, particularly at the bottom end of the labour market. However, this last fact has meant that it has been possible to sustain relatively high levels of growth, and so maintain low levels of unemployment, without setting off inflation. This has been a huge benefit of migration that the Committee seems to underplay.

A further benefit is that when a downturn comes, much of the impact can be absorbed by migrants returning to their home countries. We may already have seen the start of this process, as movements of workers from Britain to Poland are reported, in the last couple of months, to have exceeded those in the other direction.

Migration has already given us growth we could not otherwise have enjoyed. Over the next couple of years, we face a serious downturn if not a serious recession. Migration is our biggest source of hope that the impact of that downturn will be moderate.

The collapse, and subsequent takeover by JPMorgan Chase, of Bear Stearns investment bank has sent more shock waves resonating around the world's economies. The climate in the banking sector is clearly one of fear. Banks, which routinely lend to each other on a daily basis, are no longer doing so - so fearful are they that today's loans could turn out to be tomorrow's bad debts.

In a move designed to ease these fears, the Fed has already cut the rate at which it lends money to commercial banks, and is expected to cut the more general interest rate (yet again) tomorrow. Whether these interest rate cuts will work or not is moot, however - the worries are about whether loans will be repaid at all, not about how much interest is charged on the loans. In this context, the discount rate cut is a tinkering at the margins. (That's not to say that the economies of the US and UK don't need interest rate cuts to ease fears of recession - they do, but that's a slightly different albeit not altogether unrelated matter.)

More radical moves are under way with the coordinated approach of several central banks to ensure that loans can be made to the banking sector. The Fed is making up to $200 billion available, the European Central Bank up to $15 billion. The Bank of England is making £11.35 billion available as 6, 9 and 12 month maturity repurchase agreements (repos). The question is: will this be enough, or does the fact that the central banks are doing this just serve to make the whole system yet more nervy?

In light of the fact that inflationary pressures are still present, while the economy is turning down, it is clear that separate policy instruments are needed to ensure that the objectives of low inflation and high employment are met. In the recent past, monetary policy, in the form of interest rate adjustments, has been much to the fore. The announcement in today's budget that fiscal policy will be used to bolster the economy is therefore welcome.

Borrowing by government will rise to £43 billion over the next year. The government remains committed, however, to keeping to its 'golden rule' that borrowing for current expenditures should be neutral over the business cycle. This being so, the government projects that its budget deficit will fall in subsequent years.

Growth forecasts have been adjusted downwards, but the government is still anticipating growth of 2% (give or take 0.25%) this year. It expects a growth to pick up next year. This seems optimistic, and a delayed recovery could threaten adherence to the 'golden rule'. But the threat of recession now is quite severe, and it seems appropriate that - whether the 'golden rule' is met or not over the course of this cycle - fiscal actions should be taken to bolster the economy at this time.

An interesting story has broken today about the antacid medicine Gaviscon. The patent on this drug ran out several years ago, but Reckitt, which manufactures the product, has effectively precluded the marketing of generic equivalents by objecting to suggestions put forward for a name by which the unbranded product can be known. This has allowed Reckitt to sustain profits, but has cost the National Health Service (or, more accurately, the taxpayer) millions of pounds that could have been saved if an unbranded equivalent had been available.

Patents exist to give innovating companies protection from competition for a limited period. If there were no patents, companies would be reluctant to invest in research and development because imitators would come along and reduce the profits that the innovating company has earned as a result of its research. So it is right that patent protection should be available.

For a company to attempt to extend monopoly power beyond the life of a patent is understandable - it gains extra profits if it is successful in doing so. But this does also deny society the benefits of competition.

What really beggars belief about this story is that the authorities have allowed prevarication about the name of a generic product to go on for years. It is this failure to get to grips with an issue that has really been costly.

Northern Rock is in the news again. The government has decided that a 'temporary' nationalisation of the company is the best route forward. Whether they are right or not remains to be seen.

The economic literature on auctions has highlighted the existence of something known as the 'winner's curse'. In any bidding war, it is usual for some bidders to underestimate the value of the lot, while others overestimate it. By choosing the nationalisation option, the government is implicitly suggesting that the various private sector bidders for Northern Rock were all undervaluing the company, and were therefore not willing to bid enough for it.

Perhaps the government is right. But equally, perhaps the government has got its own sums wrong. After all, while there were only two players in the game at the end, other private sector bidders had pulled out much earlier. Could it be that they were all wrong? Or is it more likely that the government's estimates of the financial commitment that will be needed to bail out the Rock will prove to be overly optimistic?

I was reading a fascinating paper by Eli Berman and David Laitin last week. This suggests that terrorists' choice of method - overt insurgency or suicide attacks - depends upon a number of factors. These include the terrain (with insurgency being favoured in mountainous areas), the extent to which an attack might be expected (with insurgency being favoured if the attack is a surprise), and with the level of resourcing of the security services (with surprise attacks likely being more successful than overt insurgency where there is generous resourcing).

In Iraq, overt insurgency has been the norm. But over the last month or so, suicide attacks have been getting more common, the latest case being particularly disturbing, involving as it did the use of two mentally disabled women as carriers. The surge, which has improved the resourcing and numbers of US armed forces in Iraq over recent months, has rendered conventional insurgency less fruitful for the terrorists, and this may be what has led them to turn increasingly to suicide attacks as a means of operation.

Just a week after cutting interest rates by 0.75%, the Fed has cut US rates again by 0.5%. The US economy is certainly in need of stimulus. In the last quarter of 2007, growth was barely above zero, and it looks likely that growth will turn negative this quarter.

It is too early yet to assess how the markets have responded to the move. New York markets initially responded well, but by the end of the day have fallen back considerably. The interest rate cut itself is good - the signal it sends about the severity of the malaise to which it is a response is bad news.

In an attempt to avoid further bank runs similar to the Northern Rock experience, it is being proposed that the Bank of England should be able to lend banks money without the loans being made public. There are clear benefits and drawbacks associated with this proposal.

The benefit is that, in the case of Northern Rock, the bank run was precipitated by disclosure of the fact that the company was in sufficient trouble to require special help from the Bank of England. Much in this sphere depends on confidence, and it was disclosure that eroded the public's confidence in the bank. So, the argument goes, take away disclosure and you take away the thing that saps public confidence and causes the bank run.

There are two drawbacks. The first is that taxpayers, if they are to make sensible choices at the ballot box, should know how their money is being spent. If bailouts of banks are to be kept secret, we won't know. So long as disclosure is required after a certain time period has elapsed, this problem need not be severe. The shorter the period, the less serious the problem. But also, the shorter the period, the more likely it is that the bank being helped is not yet out of trouble. Nothing has yet been said about how long this period should be - but it is clearly a crucial issue.

The second drawback is that an information vacuum tends to suck in rumour. This carries the risk that the next victim of a bank run will be an organisation that is financially very secure. The problem is that we need information about banks so that we know that we can trust them - but we need not to have information about banks that might fail. Unfortunately, though, the absence of information would mean that we knew everything that we need to know. Now there's a paradox.

And it implies that the true source of the problem lies elsewhere - in the fundamentals of banks' balance sheets. Tinkering at the edges, making information secret, is cosmetic surgery. The system needs more than that to put things right.

The US Federal Reserve today cut interest rates by 0.75% points. This is a week before the time of the month when the Fed would normally be expected to adjust rates, and has come int he wake of a significant crash in the stock market. Is this a timely and appropriate response to current economic conditions, or does it reflect panic?

Curiously, the answer is both. For the Fed walks a tightrope in deciding by how much to cut rates. Clearly the American economy is in dire need of a big stimulus. But the bigger the stimulus, the clearer the signal that things are not going well, and the more sapping is the effect on consumer confidence - and hence on spending. It is not yet clear on which side of the tightrope the Fed has trodden today - or whether it has got things exactly right.

The markets have got the jitters. Actually that's something of an understatement, with the FTSE having experienced its largest one-day drop since 9/11 yesterday. The panic amongst equity sellers is fuelled by fears of a recession in the US - something that I have been flagging on this blog for many months now. The signs are that the American economy is heading for a sharp reverse. While some of the more complacent observers note that the UK economy is in better shape (and indeed it is), the old adage that when America sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold remains true - at least when America sneezes with the kind of gusto that one can expect now.

As recently as this weekend, the Telegraph was arguing that higher interest rates should be the order of the day in the UK. It is certainly the case that inflation is a threat - given higher fuel and food prices. But, so long as wage pressure can be contained, the much more serious threat is recession. To stave off this threat, it is likely that both further interest rate cuts and a fiscal injection (an increase in the government's budget deficit) will be necessary. There are some (really) tough times ahead.

The Bank of England has kept interest rates on hold this month. This is in the face of mixed signals about where the economy is heading.

Inflation has remained steady at 2.1%. But prices for food and fuel have been rising, and there is concern that this might stoke up some inflationary pressure. At the same time, the housing market has slowed considerably, and important trading partners (including the United States) appear to be heading for recession.

In normal times, monetary policy (conducted primarily through the central bank adjusting the interest rate) can be used to regulate the economy, and it does a pretty good job. When the economy is overheating, inflation is a threat and unemployment is low - and an interest rate hike can serve to reduce demand thereby curtailing inflation. Likewise, an interest rate cut helps to stimulate demand when unemployment threatens.

The problem we have now is that we are not in normal times. Both inflation and unemployment are viewed as threats on the horizon.

Which way then for the interest rate? I would argue that it should come down in order to protect the economy from recession. There are hazards in this - most obviously, cutting the interest rate could fuel inflation at a time when prices are rising anyway. But the price rises that we have seen are one-shot increases due to specific factors - so long as wages are kept under control, there is no reason for these to generate a sustained increase in inflation.

The prime minister has, this week, stressed the need to keep public sector pay settlements down. This does not signal a return to the ill-fated incomes policies of the 1970s, but it does operate on people's expectations. The chances of a wage-price spiral occurring are much reduced if people do not expect large wage hikes.

To sum up, the direction of change for the interest rate should still be downward - though this month the Bank of England is probably right to wait, if only to ensure that the government's warnings on pay settlements are heard over the coming period.

Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, has announced new powers for the UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA). These come in the wake of the UK's first bank run for over 100 years - the now infamous case of Northern Rock. The new powers will allow the FSA to protect customers' cash if a bank gets into financial difficulties, hence giving customers priority over banks' other creditors. The FSA will also have new powers (and duties) to ensure that banks in difficulties do not suffer cash flow problems.

The new powers will become part of legislation to be passed in May of this year, following a consultation period. Broadly they are to be welcomed. There are some gaps that need to be plugged, however. Currently, responsibility for the security of the banking system is shared between the FSA, the Bank of England, and the Treasury (headed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer). That nebulosity of responsibility did not facilitate decision making in the face of Northern Rock. The new legislation needs to make very clear exactly who is responsible for what, and how the three bodies should work together. Mr Darling's preferred model is one in which the FSA and Bank of England have input, but where the final responsibility is the Chancellor's. This is a good model in that someone has clear responsibility. What needs to be worked out, though, is the nature of the input of the other two bodies - they each have information and the institutions need to be in place to ensure that each is heard.

Can migrants bail us out if the economy goes pear-shaped? It is often argued, and rightly so, that migration has been a big benefit to the British economy in recent years. The influx of workers from eastern Europe has allowed the economy to grow, while keeping inflation at low levels.

With the possibility of a recession on the horizon - or a serious downturn at least - the question needs to be asked: can this process work in reverse? One possible outcome would be for migrant workers to respond to the downturn by moving away from the country. If they are made unemployed, perhaps they will do so in their search for work elsewhere. This would mean that the downturn need not be accompanied by a surge in unemployment. That would be good news indeed.

There is, however, another possibility. Almost 40 years ago, John Harris and Michael Todaro wrote about the response of migrants to unemployment in the context of rural to urban migration in developing economies. They argued that migrants might stay in the cities even in the face of unemployment, because they are compensated for the higher probability of unemployment by higher wages when in work. A Harris-Todaro mechanism could reduce the amount of return migration during a recession in the UK, and could scupper hopes for an unemployment-free downturn.

How things will pan out is really a matter of speculation. We don't know that there will be a serious downturn - although that looks increasingly likely. And we don't know what decisions migrant workers would make if a downturn came to pass. One thing we do know - there is something here for policy makers to chew over.

Mercifully, the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee has decided to cut interest rates this month, from 5.75% to 5.5%. The question is: is a quarter point cut enough?

Some commentators have suggested that, with the recent increase in fuel prices, inflation remains a problem. This will have acted as a restraining influence on the MPC in making its decision to cut interest rates. I remain of the view, however, that fuel prices are blipping - indeed the price of oil has already fallen well over 10% from its peak, although this has yet to feed through into reduced prices at the petrol pump. The threat of wage inflation that briefly appeared earlier in the year went as fast as it came - and in any event it seems to have been driven by a small number of settlements in atypical firms.

As I have mentioned earlier on this blog, the real issue for the macroeconomy now is how resilient the US economy will prove to be to the threat of recession. The leading indicators strongly suggest that a downturn is on the way. This being so, the MPC has clearly moved interest rates in the right direction. Has it cut them enough? I don't think so. Expect more cuts early in the new year.

Will there be an interest rate cut in December? The economy is faltering, with retail sales and manufacturing output both sluggish - yet the interest rate hikes from earlier in the year have yet to take full effect in slowing things down. Meanwhile, the slump in housing starts in the US is little short of catastrophic, and downturns in this series traditionally herald recession; and we all know that when the US sneezes it takes little time for the the UK to catch a cold.

On the other side, there are concerns that escalating oil prices fuel inflation. But the currently high price of oil is, as I have argued earlier on this blog, likely to be a blip.

The Monetary Policy Committee should not wait longer before cutting rates, and arguably should do so by more than a quarter of a point this month.

You don't need 20-20 vision to have seen how much more expensive it has become to fill your car with fuel in the last few weeks. Diesel has already topped the £1 per litre mark, and unleaded petrol is not lagging far behind.

The cause is a jump in oil prices. Oil is now trading at $89 per barrel, and some observers think that the $100 barrel is not far away. The immediate cause is tension between Turkey and the Kurdish population in northern Iraq - there is a fear that this might escalate to fighting that would disrupt supplies. Speculators are buying up oil with a view to selling it on once the price has risen further. This in itself is pushing the price up - both because such speculation increases demand and reduces supply to the end user.

Long term the price of oil will rise. The increased demand from rapidly developing countries, and the diminishing pool of easily accessed oil both serve to ensure that. But speculative blips happen along the way which cause fluctuations (down as well as up) of the price of petrol at the pump. What we have here bears all the characteristics of such a blip.

The news of a further sharp drop in housing starts in the US must surely fuel fears that a more general economic downturn is on the cards in that country. The work of Leamer (which I have referred to in an earlier post on this blog) links recessions firmly with the state of the housing market - and in particular with residential investment.

The Fed cut the headline interest rates in the US by half a percentage point last month. That is a sharp drop in one go. But it would appear that such a policy is needed to kick-start the economy before it swings into a full-blooded recession.

Michael Greenstone has recently released the results of a study into the effects of the Surge policy in Iraq. Based upon data from the world's financial markets, in particular on the price at which bonds issued by the Iraqi state are traded, he concludes that the Surge has been unsuccessful. To be specific, people are making their investment decisions as if the probability of Iraq defaulting on these bonds has risen by some 40%. This suggests that, far from improving security and stability, the Surge has made Iraq less stable.

The Surge has, however, improved various indicators of security within Iraq. This provides a puzzle - why is there a discrepancy in the results. One possibility is that the indicator based on bond prices is more comprehensive in that it captures a measure of overall confidence in Iraq. Another possibility is that this measure is based on the assessment of people who, for the most part, have no direct experience of Iraq, and whose information may be flawed.

While Greenstone's work provides an intriguing measure, therefore, the jury has still to be out on whether the Surge has been a success.

Edward Leamer has recently produced work on the link between housing and the business cycle. He makes a compelling case in arguing that residential investment is an important leading indicator - and that looking at changes of residential investment over time can provide early warning of turns in the business cycle.

His analysis suggests that the US is heading for a recession. The recent interest rate cuts introduced by the Fed suggest that the policy response is already under way.

We all know that when America sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold. The signs are that the next 18 months or so may prove to be a bumpy ride.