Just a week after cutting interest rates by 0.75%, the Fed has cut US rates again by 0.5%. The US economy is certainly in need of stimulus. In the last quarter of 2007, growth was barely above zero, and it looks likely that growth will turn negative this quarter.

It is too early yet to assess how the markets have responded to the move. New York markets initially responded well, but by the end of the day have fallen back considerably. The interest rate cut itself is good - the signal it sends about the severity of the malaise to which it is a response is bad news.

In an attempt to avoid further bank runs similar to the Northern Rock experience, it is being proposed that the Bank of England should be able to lend banks money without the loans being made public. There are clear benefits and drawbacks associated with this proposal.

The benefit is that, in the case of Northern Rock, the bank run was precipitated by disclosure of the fact that the company was in sufficient trouble to require special help from the Bank of England. Much in this sphere depends on confidence, and it was disclosure that eroded the public's confidence in the bank. So, the argument goes, take away disclosure and you take away the thing that saps public confidence and causes the bank run.

There are two drawbacks. The first is that taxpayers, if they are to make sensible choices at the ballot box, should know how their money is being spent. If bailouts of banks are to be kept secret, we won't know. So long as disclosure is required after a certain time period has elapsed, this problem need not be severe. The shorter the period, the less serious the problem. But also, the shorter the period, the more likely it is that the bank being helped is not yet out of trouble. Nothing has yet been said about how long this period should be - but it is clearly a crucial issue.

The second drawback is that an information vacuum tends to suck in rumour. This carries the risk that the next victim of a bank run will be an organisation that is financially very secure. The problem is that we need information about banks so that we know that we can trust them - but we need not to have information about banks that might fail. Unfortunately, though, the absence of information would mean that we knew everything that we need to know. Now there's a paradox.

And it implies that the true source of the problem lies elsewhere - in the fundamentals of banks' balance sheets. Tinkering at the edges, making information secret, is cosmetic surgery. The system needs more than that to put things right.

The US Federal Reserve today cut interest rates by 0.75% points. This is a week before the time of the month when the Fed would normally be expected to adjust rates, and has come int he wake of a significant crash in the stock market. Is this a timely and appropriate response to current economic conditions, or does it reflect panic?

Curiously, the answer is both. For the Fed walks a tightrope in deciding by how much to cut rates. Clearly the American economy is in dire need of a big stimulus. But the bigger the stimulus, the clearer the signal that things are not going well, and the more sapping is the effect on consumer confidence - and hence on spending. It is not yet clear on which side of the tightrope the Fed has trodden today - or whether it has got things exactly right.

The markets have got the jitters. Actually that's something of an understatement, with the FTSE having experienced its largest one-day drop since 9/11 yesterday. The panic amongst equity sellers is fuelled by fears of a recession in the US - something that I have been flagging on this blog for many months now. The signs are that the American economy is heading for a sharp reverse. While some of the more complacent observers note that the UK economy is in better shape (and indeed it is), the old adage that when America sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold remains true - at least when America sneezes with the kind of gusto that one can expect now.

As recently as this weekend, the Telegraph was arguing that higher interest rates should be the order of the day in the UK. It is certainly the case that inflation is a threat - given higher fuel and food prices. But, so long as wage pressure can be contained, the much more serious threat is recession. To stave off this threat, it is likely that both further interest rate cuts and a fiscal injection (an increase in the government's budget deficit) will be necessary. There are some (really) tough times ahead.

The Bank of England has kept interest rates on hold this month. This is in the face of mixed signals about where the economy is heading.

Inflation has remained steady at 2.1%. But prices for food and fuel have been rising, and there is concern that this might stoke up some inflationary pressure. At the same time, the housing market has slowed considerably, and important trading partners (including the United States) appear to be heading for recession.

In normal times, monetary policy (conducted primarily through the central bank adjusting the interest rate) can be used to regulate the economy, and it does a pretty good job. When the economy is overheating, inflation is a threat and unemployment is low - and an interest rate hike can serve to reduce demand thereby curtailing inflation. Likewise, an interest rate cut helps to stimulate demand when unemployment threatens.

The problem we have now is that we are not in normal times. Both inflation and unemployment are viewed as threats on the horizon.

Which way then for the interest rate? I would argue that it should come down in order to protect the economy from recession. There are hazards in this - most obviously, cutting the interest rate could fuel inflation at a time when prices are rising anyway. But the price rises that we have seen are one-shot increases due to specific factors - so long as wages are kept under control, there is no reason for these to generate a sustained increase in inflation.

The prime minister has, this week, stressed the need to keep public sector pay settlements down. This does not signal a return to the ill-fated incomes policies of the 1970s, but it does operate on people's expectations. The chances of a wage-price spiral occurring are much reduced if people do not expect large wage hikes.

To sum up, the direction of change for the interest rate should still be downward - though this month the Bank of England is probably right to wait, if only to ensure that the government's warnings on pay settlements are heard over the coming period.

Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, has announced new powers for the UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA). These come in the wake of the UK's first bank run for over 100 years - the now infamous case of Northern Rock. The new powers will allow the FSA to protect customers' cash if a bank gets into financial difficulties, hence giving customers priority over banks' other creditors. The FSA will also have new powers (and duties) to ensure that banks in difficulties do not suffer cash flow problems.

The new powers will become part of legislation to be passed in May of this year, following a consultation period. Broadly they are to be welcomed. There are some gaps that need to be plugged, however. Currently, responsibility for the security of the banking system is shared between the FSA, the Bank of England, and the Treasury (headed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer). That nebulosity of responsibility did not facilitate decision making in the face of Northern Rock. The new legislation needs to make very clear exactly who is responsible for what, and how the three bodies should work together. Mr Darling's preferred model is one in which the FSA and Bank of England have input, but where the final responsibility is the Chancellor's. This is a good model in that someone has clear responsibility. What needs to be worked out, though, is the nature of the input of the other two bodies - they each have information and the institutions need to be in place to ensure that each is heard.

Can migrants bail us out if the economy goes pear-shaped? It is often argued, and rightly so, that migration has been a big benefit to the British economy in recent years. The influx of workers from eastern Europe has allowed the economy to grow, while keeping inflation at low levels.

With the possibility of a recession on the horizon - or a serious downturn at least - the question needs to be asked: can this process work in reverse? One possible outcome would be for migrant workers to respond to the downturn by moving away from the country. If they are made unemployed, perhaps they will do so in their search for work elsewhere. This would mean that the downturn need not be accompanied by a surge in unemployment. That would be good news indeed.

There is, however, another possibility. Almost 40 years ago, John Harris and Michael Todaro wrote about the response of migrants to unemployment in the context of rural to urban migration in developing economies. They argued that migrants might stay in the cities even in the face of unemployment, because they are compensated for the higher probability of unemployment by higher wages when in work. A Harris-Todaro mechanism could reduce the amount of return migration during a recession in the UK, and could scupper hopes for an unemployment-free downturn.

How things will pan out is really a matter of speculation. We don't know that there will be a serious downturn - although that looks increasingly likely. And we don't know what decisions migrant workers would make if a downturn came to pass. One thing we do know - there is something here for policy makers to chew over.

Mercifully, the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee has decided to cut interest rates this month, from 5.75% to 5.5%. The question is: is a quarter point cut enough?

Some commentators have suggested that, with the recent increase in fuel prices, inflation remains a problem. This will have acted as a restraining influence on the MPC in making its decision to cut interest rates. I remain of the view, however, that fuel prices are blipping - indeed the price of oil has already fallen well over 10% from its peak, although this has yet to feed through into reduced prices at the petrol pump. The threat of wage inflation that briefly appeared earlier in the year went as fast as it came - and in any event it seems to have been driven by a small number of settlements in atypical firms.

As I have mentioned earlier on this blog, the real issue for the macroeconomy now is how resilient the US economy will prove to be to the threat of recession. The leading indicators strongly suggest that a downturn is on the way. This being so, the MPC has clearly moved interest rates in the right direction. Has it cut them enough? I don't think so. Expect more cuts early in the new year.

Will there be an interest rate cut in December? The economy is faltering, with retail sales and manufacturing output both sluggish - yet the interest rate hikes from earlier in the year have yet to take full effect in slowing things down. Meanwhile, the slump in housing starts in the US is little short of catastrophic, and downturns in this series traditionally herald recession; and we all know that when the US sneezes it takes little time for the the UK to catch a cold.

On the other side, there are concerns that escalating oil prices fuel inflation. But the currently high price of oil is, as I have argued earlier on this blog, likely to be a blip.

The Monetary Policy Committee should not wait longer before cutting rates, and arguably should do so by more than a quarter of a point this month.

You don't need 20-20 vision to have seen how much more expensive it has become to fill your car with fuel in the last few weeks. Diesel has already topped the £1 per litre mark, and unleaded petrol is not lagging far behind.

The cause is a jump in oil prices. Oil is now trading at $89 per barrel, and some observers think that the $100 barrel is not far away. The immediate cause is tension between Turkey and the Kurdish population in northern Iraq - there is a fear that this might escalate to fighting that would disrupt supplies. Speculators are buying up oil with a view to selling it on once the price has risen further. This in itself is pushing the price up - both because such speculation increases demand and reduces supply to the end user.

Long term the price of oil will rise. The increased demand from rapidly developing countries, and the diminishing pool of easily accessed oil both serve to ensure that. But speculative blips happen along the way which cause fluctuations (down as well as up) of the price of petrol at the pump. What we have here bears all the characteristics of such a blip.

The news of a further sharp drop in housing starts in the US must surely fuel fears that a more general economic downturn is on the cards in that country. The work of Leamer (which I have referred to in an earlier post on this blog) links recessions firmly with the state of the housing market - and in particular with residential investment.

The Fed cut the headline interest rates in the US by half a percentage point last month. That is a sharp drop in one go. But it would appear that such a policy is needed to kick-start the economy before it swings into a full-blooded recession.

Michael Greenstone has recently released the results of a study into the effects of the Surge policy in Iraq. Based upon data from the world's financial markets, in particular on the price at which bonds issued by the Iraqi state are traded, he concludes that the Surge has been unsuccessful. To be specific, people are making their investment decisions as if the probability of Iraq defaulting on these bonds has risen by some 40%. This suggests that, far from improving security and stability, the Surge has made Iraq less stable.

The Surge has, however, improved various indicators of security within Iraq. This provides a puzzle - why is there a discrepancy in the results. One possibility is that the indicator based on bond prices is more comprehensive in that it captures a measure of overall confidence in Iraq. Another possibility is that this measure is based on the assessment of people who, for the most part, have no direct experience of Iraq, and whose information may be flawed.

While Greenstone's work provides an intriguing measure, therefore, the jury has still to be out on whether the Surge has been a success.

Edward Leamer has recently produced work on the link between housing and the business cycle. He makes a compelling case in arguing that residential investment is an important leading indicator - and that looking at changes of residential investment over time can provide early warning of turns in the business cycle.

His analysis suggests that the US is heading for a recession. The recent interest rate cuts introduced by the Fed suggest that the policy response is already under way.

We all know that when America sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold. The signs are that the next 18 months or so may prove to be a bumpy ride.

Banks are funny businesses. They receive our deposits and then take a calculated risk by lending out some of this money to other people. By charging borrowers more interest than they pay lenders, they make a profit. Usually things work just fine, by that element of risk is always there. What if depositors all ask for their money back at once? Again, usually, things work out fine. If this happens, the bank has to borrow from other banks. So long as its assets (the loans it has made to borrowers) are sound, there should be no problem in doing this. Sometimes, though, confidence can be a fragile thing. This is just what has been demonstrated in recent days by the story of Northern Rock.

Northern Rock has sound assets - mortgages that can be expected to be repaid. Its recent history is, in this respect, a little puzzling. But it is indicative of an underlying lack of confidence that is giving the whole financial system the jitters at present. Lower interest rates would help steady nerves. But, under the present system, interest rates are not set with that in mind. Legislating for a minimum amount of banks' assets to be held in liquid form (as cash, for example) might also help, though this presumes that the authorities know better than the banks themselves what is good for the latters' business. Such required reserve ratios do, however, exist in several countries. Giving savers a guarantee that their savings are safe is another solution that can prevent a run on banks - but it would not encourage prudent behaviour by the banks.

There are no simple cures for the jitters, therefore. But there is some consolation in knowing that the reason for that is, in part at least, because there is no obvious cause either.

The Taxpayers' Alliance suggests that environmental taxes in the UK have gone too far. The group argues that the tax take is greater than the cost of the environmental damage caused by pollution. This misses the point.

The taxes are not there to raise money. They are there to raise the relative price, and so reduce the consumption, of things that lead to pollution. There may be legitimate concern that green taxes are being used as a type of stealth tax - a sneaky way to increase the overall tax burden. But that is not a problem that should necessarily be fixed by reducing environmental taxes - if, as seems to be the case, such taxes are effective in tackling pollution, a better solution would be to reduce the burden of conventional taxes, such as income tax of VAT.

Zimbabwe's inflation rate has hit a staggering 7600%. The International Monetary Fund has suggested that it may rise further over the coming months, possibly to as much as 100000%. German economic students will be pleased - it means that their lecturers will at last stop using their country's experience after the first world was as an example of hyperinflation.

Robert Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe, has frozen prices and wages in an attempt to curb the inflation. Price and wage controls have been used before, of course, including in the UK during the 1970s. They work too, but experience suggests that their beneficial impact is short-lived. This is because they do not tackle the fundamental cause of inflation. As Milton Friedman so memorably said: 'Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.'

The flip side of rising prices is the falling value of money. Money falls in value because the stock of money in circulation is rising. The fix for inflation is to curb this increase in the money stock. In practice that means hiking interest rates so that people prefer to hold their assets in an interest bearing form - that is, they trade their money for interest-bearing assets.

The overnight interest rate in Zimbabwe is currently 600%. That may sound high, but it is dwarfed by the rate of price increase, so the real rate of interest is negative. People take out loans, knowing that in real terms they will pay back (a lot) less than they have borrowed. This fuels demand, and prices skyrocket.

Drastic times call for drastic measures. A credible stance against this hyperinflation probably means a new currency, one that is linked to a stable international currency, and the adoption of a really tough interest rate policy. To the extent that credibility is linked with people, it means new people too.

Share prices are tumbling. The root cause appears to be concern over defaults on loans in the USA, specifically in the sub-prime lending market. The sub-prime market offers mortgage loans to people who might not be able to get loans from mainstream lenders - in other words, high risk borrowers. As American interest rates have risen, so the default rate on these loans has increased.

The extent of these defaults is currently only being guessed at, with estimates up to several hundred billion dollars. Obviously this is a huge amount, and it is easy to see why investors have become jittery. Nevertheless, sub-prime lenders insure themselves to some degree against default by charging higher interest rates than the norm. A high rate of default in this market is par for the course. This is not to minimise the potential seriousness of the current situation. But it is likely that many investors are pulling their money out of the equity markets on the basis of fears of a worst case scenario. Eventually the market will bottom out, and the likelihood is that there will be some bounce-back - a re-adjustment back up to bring prices in line with the real (rather than the feared) situation. Just when it will bottom out, and how substantial the bounce-back will be remains unclear at this point.

Nobel prizewinning economist, Robert Fogel, has recently produced a paper that makes alarming predictions for those of us living in Western Europe. He identifies 6 main economic regions in the world - the USA, the EU (prior to accession of the 12 new members), India, China, Japan, and a group of 6 SE Asian 'tigers'. In the year 2000, the EU lagged only slightly behind the USA as the region with the highest gross domestic product. By the year 2040, Fogel expects the USA's GDP to have quadrupled in size. But China's GDP by then will be three times that of the USA. India's will be roughly the same as the USA's. The EU's GDP, meanwhile, will have fallen to little more than a third of that of the USA.

In terms of per capita figures, Fogel expects the average person in China to have more than twice as much income as the average person in the (pre-accession) EU by the year 2040.

These figures imply an alarming stagnation in Western Europe. There are two reasons for this. First, Fogel expects growth per capita in Europe to be slow (just 1.2% per year in real terms - less than a third of that assumed for the USA, and one seventh of that assumed for China). Secondly, he expects population to be stagnant in Western Europe. He explains his low assumption of per capita growth by reference to the demographic time bomb - the rapid ageing of the population in some countries means that much resource will need to go towards supporting the retired (consumption expenditure) rather than investment. It is true that this might put a brake on growth in some European countries - notably Italy and Germany - but by no means all. Meanwhile, Fogel's prediction of stagnant population growth in Western Europe has already been debunked. Migration is taking care of that.

Moreover, the assumption that China can continue to grow at over 8% per year over a further period of more than 30 years is a strong one. At some stage, such rapid growth is likely to lead to inflation - the symptom of an overheated economy. Given the uneven nature of growth in China - with a highly developed seaboard and a western interior that remains poor - such overheating is likely sooner rather than later, and this will inevitably constrain the potential of that huge economy to maintain its current growth performance.

The Fogel figures seem to exaggerate the challenge faced by Europe, but this does not mean that there is no challenge. The world's most rapidly developing economies are growing partly because they are catching up with the world's richest. But partly also they are growing because the rewards to initiative, invention and enterprise are huge. Therein lies a lesson.

Things are not going well in the European Union summit. The story is that Nikolas Sarkozy, the new French president, has insisted that the commitment to 'free and undistorted competition' be watered down; it appears that this commitment may be replaced by one that aims at a 'social market economy aiming at full employment'.

Tony Blair, reaching the end of his tenure as the British prime minister, has issues of his own - he wishes to safeguard the UK's law-making and foreign policy powers. But these matters should not distract him from the need to focus also on the free market issue.

Full employment is a phrase that sounds as though it should be easy to understand - but it isn't. There are many people who choose not to work, for a variety of (usually very worthy) reasons. Full employment does not, presumably, mean that no-one is allowed to be a student, to look after children or elderly relatives, or to retire. At any time, there will also be some people who are between jobs; in many cases they can search more effectively for new employment while they are unemployed. So there will always be some unemployment. Working definitions of 'full employment' acknowledge this. What 'full employment' means, therefore, is low unemployment - a rather vague concept.

Now one way of achieving the goal of low unemployment is for the government to provide plenty of financial support to industry. In this way, when trade slumps, the threat of mass redundancies can be averted. If trade in a particular sector is set to bounce back up after a short term slump, this might indeed not be an altogether bad policy to implement - though of course it would be better if firms were managed in such a way as to weather such transient storms themselves.

The problems come when government provides substantial long term support to businesses that would otherwise be ailing. We saw plenty of this in the UK in the 1970s. The coal, steel, air travel, and car manufacturing industries hit troubled times and were bailed out by government (that is, taxpayers') money. But the tide had turned - other countries could by then produce these things more efficiently than we could in the UK. Ultimately the power of the market won out, the state support ended, the UK industries suffered, and unemployment shot up.

Providing financial support to industry is a natural thing for governments to want to do. It can alleviate unemployment - at least until the next election. It can provide short term relief for some severe social problems. But - and here's the nub - it cannot do so indefinitely. Ultimately, market pressures will win out. When they do, as they did in early '80s Britain, the bump is all the more painful.

'Free and undistorted competition' is a means to an end. 'Full employment' is an end in itself. While competition is sometimes difficult for politicians to stomach, in the long run it serves the goal of low unemployment rather well. It should not be sacrificed on the altar of a European fudge.

In the European context, free competition also means the application of strict anti-trust regulation. This protects us all from the abuse of monopoly power - the tendency for firms that are dominant in their industry to set high prices (because there are few alternatives available to their customers), and to produce at a scale of operation that is not the most efficient. Curbing the power of monopolies would seem to be an altogether desirable thing.

President Sarkozy came to power on a reforming agenda that led many commentators to draw comparisons with Margaret Thatcher. Her regime was characterised by a pretty poor record on the macroeconomy, but also by some excellent microeconomic policies which still provide benefits today - these include the promotion of competition. If the comparisons are to continue, President Sarkozy has an awful lot to learn.

The beleaguered president of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, is to resign following allegations that he arranged preferential employment terms for his partner. In a deal reached to secure his resignation, the board of directors of the bank have announced that they accept that he acted 'ethically and in good faith'.

Corruption is undoubtedly a major cause of economic hardship in many countries in which the World Bank is engaged. The head of the organisation not only has to be squeaky clean in order to be effective in combatting such corruption - he or she has to be seen to be squeaky clean. Mr Wolfowitz may have been caught up in a labyrinth of World Bank regulations, he may have suffered by receiving ambiguous advice, and he may have done what he thought was right at the time. None of that matters. His moral authority to lead an organisation that is battling against corruption evaporated, and so he had to go.