Today marks the tenth anniversary of this blog. It's been an exciting ten years for observers of the economy. But listing some of the early topics covered in the blog provides a remarkable insight into how the world has changed over this time.

-student tuition fees raised to £3000 - and Conservative party plans to scrap tuition fees

-the congestion charge introduced in London (at a daily rate of £5) and the first motorway toll road opened

-the five economic tests for UK membership of the euro assessed

Inevitably, though, in looking back over the last decade, it is the Great Recession that stands out as an economic event of magnitude. The crisis, presaged in the UK by Northern Rock and reaching a climax with the collapse of Lehmans, has lasted over 5 years and output is still well below pre-crisis levels. The 6 September 2012 policy change by the European Central Bank has been instrumental in reducing interest rate spreads across the continent, and offers some hope that we may finally enter a period of sustained recovery. Nevertheless policymakers are still walking a tightrope - they must encourage growth while still attending to the fiscal deficit and guarding against inflation. The impact of deficit reduction policies, alongside the still fragile international economic environment, will mean that recovery is a slow process. So economics is, for better or worse, likely to remain interesting well into the next ten years.

In a recent paper, Robert Gilhooly, Martin Weale and Tomasz Wieladek have shown that the application of different estimation methods lead to widely varying conclusions about how output growth has been affected by (i) demand and (ii) productivity over the recent past. While traditional measures suggest that, for the UK, demand deficiency is almost uniquely responsible for slowdown, the application of a more refined method suggests that demand and productivity effects are equally responsible.

Essentially, the method proposed by Gilhooly, Weale and Wieladek is designed to compensate for biases that result from the fact that the fortunes of different sectors of the economy are intertwined at any point in time. Traditional methods that are used in this context do not work well when the time period under consideration is short, but these authors finesse this problem by adopting Bayesian methods. They argue that superior forecasting properties of their model suggest that its results should be taken more seriously than those of exercises based on other methodologies.

An important question then remains: if as much as half of the drop in output has been due to a fall-off in productivity, how can this fall-off have happened? If the findings imply that, over the course of the recession, we have unlearned the lessons of how to produce efficiently, then it is reasonable to question how such amnesia can occur.

To some extent, the decline in real wages may have allowed firms to retain labour while tolerating a fall in productivity - a fall that in itself reflects a drop in demand for the firms' output. Labour hoarding of this kind is readily explained in a context where firms expect a rapid return to growth and anticipate future labour shortages. It is not clear that this is the case now.

Another explanation may be that high productivity sectors have declined for secular reasons - for example, as natural resources have been depleted, the output of the extractive industries has fallen. This might suggest that there is a more permanent element to the decline in productivity, and that we should not output to grow rapidly to its previous high level.

It is possible, therefore, to put a rationale on the findings of Gilhooly et al. that productivity decline has been an important driver of recession. More work is probably needed before it is safe to conclude that this explains as much of the drop in output as the authors suggest. But their research certainly serves a purpose in reminding us that there is work to be done on the supply side of the economy as well as on the demand side as we seek to climb out of recession.

Some fascinating research by Ed Lazear, Kathryn Shaw and Christopher Stanton has evaluated the importance of a good boss. They find a substantial effect - a finding that has important implications for both the debate about remuneration of senior bosses and the more general question of how marginal productivity should be measured.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer presented his Autumn Statement earlier today. At the time of the last election, the main parties offered economic policies that differed in terms of how quickly they would tackle the budget deficit. The reality is now that the deficit will be closed more slowly than either party planned. This throws into pretty sharp relief the extent to which wiggle room has vanished.

A major difficulty over the last two years has been the continued weakness of the Eurozone. This has hit growth, and consequently had an adverse effect on tax receipts.

Taxpayers know that the deficit must be paid off sometime. The trick is to phase the austerity measures in such a way that, in time, they result in a reduced burden of debt, while not choking off the growth that is essential to the repayment of that debt. Current forecasts suggest that it will be the latter half of next year before any significant growth resumes, and this makes the balancing act particularly difficult. In this context it is particularly important that fiscally neutral changes in tax and government spending should be tilted to favour growth - this means that the raising of tax allowances and the investments in infrastructure are both to be welcomed.

Meanwhile, the statement points to the spending review that is to take place in the first half of 2013. The plans for deficit reduction, and specifically for government spending, in this statement indicate that the review will need to take a draconian stance. The extent to which that turns out to be feasible in practice will depend heavily on the broader macroeconomic context. If the European economy remains fragile beyond 2013, further fiscal retrenchment at home is likely to prolong still further the return to significant levels of growth. Indeed, the extent of retrenchment that is anticipated in today's statement may prove infeasible.

The latest results from my neural network forecaster for the UK continues to suggest that economic recovery is likely to be consolidated only in the latter part of next year - and the indications are now that the rate of this recovery will be quite slow.

The fragility of the economy in the Eurozone remains a concern - regardless of conditions within the UK itself, there are still some significant downside risks.

Fiscal Studies has published a special issue on higher education finance, and has made the contents freely avaiable for download. It's a good read. I particularly like the paper by Chowdry et al. Two things in their paper strike me as particularly interesting:

(1) 'The proportion of graduates who reach the new debt write-off point of 30 years increases to 56 per cent' - in other words most graduates will never repay the full amount of their loan. Indeed, 'the average female graduate will pay back just over half of what they borrow, compared with 87 per cent for the average male graduate'. This, of course, means that many (if not most) students are indifferent about the precise level of fees that they are charged, and this in turn incentivises many universities to charge at the cap of £9000. Another implication of this is that the taxpayer ends up having to bear the burden of the unpaid debt, so that the exchequer savings of the new scheme are not as great as might have been hoped. On the assumption that growth raises graduate earnings by 1.5% per year, the exchequer savings amount to £500m per year - which represents a relatively minor reduction in the public sector deficit.

(2) The paper does not produce revised estimates of the rate of return to higher education. It does point out that the average graudate 'will in futre make repayments totalling £25830 over their lifetime - an increase of 52%' compared with the system that existed before 2012. Meanwhile, 'the average student enjoys an increase in cash support during their degree of some 12 per cent, amounting to £19580 in total'. For some students at the margin, the rate of return to higher education has presumably fallen to such an extent that the investment is no longer worthwhile.

Chowdry, H., Dearden, L., Goodman, A., & Jin, W. (2012). The Distributional Impact of the 2012-13 Higher Education Funding Reforms in England* Fiscal Studies, 33 (2), 211-236 DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5890.2012.00159.x

The latest World Economic Outlook publication by the International Monetary Fund offers interesting evidence on fiscal multipliers. While 'fiscal multipliers were near 0.5 in advanced economies during the three decades leading up to 2009', the report finds that 'multipliers have actually been in the 0.9 to 1.7 range since the Great Recession'. Simon Wren-Lewis has recently provided a compelling analysis of what this means for the UK. While the global economic environment has done little to help, the double dip may well have been avoidable.

The 1% increase in GDP achieved in the third quarter of this year represents tremendously welcome news. Part of this increase is surely due to the effect of the Olympics, part to the subdued second quarter (with its glut of public holidays), and it is possible that part could be wiped away as more information comes in and revisions are made to the statistics. Nonetheless, it is difficult to perceive this as anything but an encouraging result. The return to growth has come a little earlier than many (myself included) expected. It does contribute towards an explanation of the encouraging employment figures that were released last week.

There remain uncertainties in the economic environment that suggest that the celebrations need to be tinged with some caution. But Mario Draghi's announcement of the European Central Bank's new stance has been helpful, and interest rate spreads in Spain, Italy and Portugal have fallen markedly - and stayed down. They are still too high for comfort, but the position is markedly more encouraging than it was just 6 weeks ago.

Paul Gregg and Steve Machin have recently examined the way in which the sensitivity of the real wage to unemployment rates has become stronger over the last decade or so. I have noted this in an earlier blog post, though I would argue that the change slightly predated the 2003 point identified by Gregg and Machin. Whether, as the economy begins to recover, real wage restraint will continue is moot. If wage pressure returns over the next twelve months or so - before the recovery is consolidated - it may well be the case that interest rate hikes will be needed sooner rather than later in order to prevent a stagflation.

Mario Draghi's announcement of the European Central Bank's new policy on bonds has had a positive effect on interest rate spreads. This is encouraging news, finally. Here are the data for the spread between German and Spanish interest rates.

The news that the European Central Bank will pursue outright monetary transactions (OMTs) - purchases of bonds issued by eurozone member countries - as a means of reducing borrowing costs for these countries is very welcome. The conditions under which such transactions will take place remain unclear; the ECB intends to purchase bonds only when it perceives serious distortions to the market, where these distortions are based on what it deems to be unfounded fears. Moreover, the ECB's intervention will be conditional upon the action being part of the European Stability Mechanism, making the availability of such support dependent on countries' compliance with fiscal discipline requirements. This last condition is critical, but the binary nature of any judgement about compliance means that pressure will inevitably come to bear in instances where the judgement is marginal. A better solution would be to offer support on a sliding scale, making support more costly where discipline is weaker. This would effectively be the solution offered by conditional bonds.

Nevertheless, the new initiative is a major step forward. It had been anticipated by the markets - the interest rate spreads for countries such as Spain and Italy had already fallen dramatically over the last day or so. In itself, this is a welcome outcome, though the spreads still have a long way to fall.

Some time ago, I reported on the differences between recent UK and US experience in terms of changes in productivity levels. A similar theme has emerged in recent work by Abigail Hughes and Jumana Saleheen. These authors identify some interesting sectoral patterns. Prior to the financial crisis, productivity growth in the services sector in the UK appeared to be strong; the crisis had an obvious adverse impact on (particularly financial) services, and many of the pre-crisis gains were subsequently lost. There has, since, been a modest recovery in productivity in this sector, however.

Meanwhile, productivity in the energy sector - where North Sea reserves are rapidly being depleted - has declined. In this context, driving the UK towards sustainable productivity growth is likely to be a challenge.

Investment in physical and human capital, and policies to foster innovation are conventional cures for productivity malaise. Business investment requires access to finance and also requires confidence that demand will grow into the future.

Continued uncertainty about the macroeconomic outlook - and especially about the outcome of the Euro crisis - is, in the absence of a quick resolution, likely to continue to frustrate hopes of a speedy return to healthy productivity growth.

Abigail Hughes, & Jumana Saleheen (2012). UK labour productivity since the onset of the crisis - an international and historical perspective Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 138-146

The latest results from my neural network forecasting model, based on industrial production (K222) in the UK are presented below - the data are outturn rates of growth up to June of this year (in blue) and forecasts for the following 24 months (in red).

It is clear that the medium term outlook remains grim. While the growth rate has by now pretty much bottomed out, these data suggest that the return to a positive rate of growth will not come until late next year.

Of course, such a simple model cannot take into account the plethora of uncertainties surrounding the Euro crisis and its ramifications for economic conditions in our major export markets. The risks there, however, remain predominantly on the downside.

The public finance data for July were disappointing; a prolonged recession is likely to mean dampened government revenues and increased government spending on welfare, so, while output struggles to recover, the outlook for deficit reduction is poor.

As I wrote last month, the news from Spain provides a cold shower. The recent movement of the spread showing the difference between interest rates at which the Spanish authorities can access debt and the German counterpart has been alarming. With the spread now well over 6 per cent, Spain's debt is becoming unsustainable, and a bail-out is looking increasingly inevitable.



A rescue package for an economy the size of Spain's will inevitably put strain on other European economies. With this scenario as the backdrop, the news that Moody's credit rating agency has announced negative outlooks for Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, is unsurprising.

News that BPP, the for-profit university college, is launching cut-price degrees in nursing and psychology comes side by side with some warnings from economists who have studied the for-profit higher education sector in the United States. Kevin Lang and Russell Weinstein find that, while the returns to studying for a degree from a traditional insititution of higher education are considerable, those associated with degrees (and other qualifications) from for-profits are negligible. Similar observations have been made by Nobel prizewinner Joe Stiglitz. As the UK for-profit higher education sector branches out into health, prospective students receive a health warning about such ventures.

The contrasting experiences of the UK and US over recent years, in terms of changes in labour productivity, has been noted for a while. Now, Abigail Hughes and Jumana Saleheen have produced an analysis that shows that UK productivity - having grown strongly in the run-up to the Great Recession - has been sluggish since, in comparison not only with the US but also with other major European economies. 

The relatively strong productivity growth in some other economies - particularly in southern Europe - may well be due to the rapid increase in unemployment, with relatively low productivity workers losing their jobs. But the sluggish growth productivity in the UK has to be a source of concern. It reflects, in part at least, a lack of confidence in future prospects, and a consequent failure of businesses to invest.

While demand factors likely dominate the economic situation in the short term, in the longer term supply factors are clearly of paramount importance. The supply side issues that underpin the underperformance of the UK in international comparisons of productivity therefore warrant urgent attention. 



Abigail Hughes and Jumana Saleheen (2012). UK labour productivity since the onset of the crisis — an international and historical perspective Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 52 (2), 138-146

Much of the debate about the merits of austerity policies concerns an empirical issue: how effective can fiscal policy be in stimulating the growth that can later help pay off deficits? Some new evidence on this comes from a paper by Karel Mertens and Morten Ravn (nicely summarised here). It suggests that the medium term response of national output (around 2 years after a shock) to a change in the tax take is quite substantial. Over the long run, of course, it is real things (such as productivity) that affect output growth - but over the short and medium term, fiscal policy can give the economy a substantial kick.

Arguing in favour of a fiscal injection that would, in the short term, serve to widen the government's budget deficit does of course represent a tough political challenge. But the evidence is clear that such an injection would serve to promote growth. And, with inflation now back within the Bank of England's target range, the argument that it would stoke inflation is increasingly difficult to sustain.

Karel Mertens and Morten Ravn (2012). A reconciliation of SVAR and narrative estimators of tax multipliers Cornell University Working Paper

The gap between the interest rates at which Spanish and German 10 year bonds are being offered has risen inexorably over the last couple of weeks. This is a cold shower for anyone celebrating the Greek election results.

Two new packages of support for the UK economy have been announced in a speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the Mansion House speech yesterday. The Bank of England's 'funding for lending' scheme will release £80 billion worth of loans, at low rates of interest, to commercial banks which will then undertake to lend to businesses. Meanwhile, in addition, 6-month loans will be offered to the commercial banks - the intention is to loan out at least £5 billion per month in this way. The aim of these two schemes is to effect a significant injection into the economy, which is facing what Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, yesterday described as 'an ugly picture'.

Faced by such a dismal economic picture, the success of these initiatives will depend on the extent to which extra liquidity will translate into extra economic activity. With gloomy prospects and low levels of confidence about the medium term outlook, businesses may not consider this to be the best time to invest. Pushing 'Plan A' - expansionary monetary policy combined with fiscal retrenchment - to the limit is all well and good. But in a liquidity trap monetary policy alone cannot deliver growth.

The government's White Paper on banking reform, published yesterday, represents a response to the report of the Independent Commission on Banking led by Sir John Vickers. The recommendations made by Vickers have in large measure been taken up. This means that retail banking will be ring-fenced, protecting depositors in the retail market from potential adverse consequences of risky activities undertaken elsewhere in the bank. Vickers (in paragraph 2.28 of the report) recommended that the leverage ratio (the ratio of equity to assets) should be set at a minimum of just over 4% for large banks - above the international norm of 3% - as a means of safeguarding the ring-fenced activity against excessive risk. The White Paper indicates that the government has not accepted this recommendation, and retains a 3% requirement. Nevertheless, the government's proposals are, in large measure, those of the Commission. 

Much remains to be done, however. A key failing of the banking system is that it is insufficiently competitive. The players in this industry are too large. Given the extent to which economies of scale prevail, it is easy to understand how this situation has come about. Nonetheless, other industries are subject to regulation to ensure competition, and banking needs to be no different. The White Paper makes reference to the forthcoming divestment of part of Lloyds Banking Group, and points out that this is an opportunity to increase competition. It is indeed such an opportunity, but I suspect that, beyond hoping that this will be so, the need for much more aggressive regulation remains acute.